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The Intergenerational Effects of Tax Policy in an 
Overlapping Generations Model with Housing Assets† 
By YOUNG WOOK LEE* 
Using an overlapping generations model, this paper examines tax 
policy effects across generations. The model incorporates housing 
assets separately from capital assets and includes taxes on labor 
income, capital income, consumption and housing assets. Tax reforms 
for each tax rate have different effects on tax burdens across 
generations and the overall efficiency of the economy, leading to 
different welfare costs for generations. Specifically, raising housing 
property taxes results in the smallest welfare loss by future generations, 
as in the model it does not hurt economic efficiency and the tax burden 
increases mainly for the elderly, who have accumulated housing assets 
in preparation for retirement. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
oncerns about fiscal sustainability are rising as government expenditures on 
welfare continue to increase. Specifically, rapid population aging is expected 
to increase expenditures on pensions, health insurance, and long-term care 
insurance for the elderly. On the other hand, population aging can slow economic 
growth and weaken the tax revenue base. As a result, total expenditures are 
expected to increase more rapidly than total revenue, and government debt is 
expected to expand.1 
Government debt is increased by deferring the tax burden of the current 
generation, which may ultimately lead to an increase in the tax burden of future 
generations. However, if the expansion of government expenditures is mainly due to 
welfare expenditures for the current generation, there could be an intergenerational 
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1The debt ratio is expected to increase from 40% of GDP to 62.4~151.8% in 2060 (Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, 2015; National Assembly Budget Office, 2016). 
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imbalance between the benefit and the burden. In particular, as welfare 
expenditures due to population aging are expected to increase sharply, the 
intergenerational problem of who will bear the burden could become serious. In 
fact, several studies point out that intergenerational equity has worsened in Korea. 
Chun (2012) argues that as aging-related expenditures grow, the burden on the 
current young and future generations will also increase. Moreover, under the 
current pension and welfare systems, the current generation has less of a burden 
than the benefit received, while future generations may experience more burden 
than benefit to secure fiscal sustainability (Choi, 2013; Lee, 2015a).
In the early stages of the development of a welfare system, some difference in 
burden and benefit between generations may be inevitable. However, fiscal efforts 
should not seek to maintain or expand this imbalance and should instead seek to 
ensure financial sustainability. Recently, a tax increase is being discussed to cover 
increasing government expenditures. In discussing tax policies, it is also necessary 
to consider how to alleviate the current imbalance structure of the burden and 
benefit between generations. 
This paper examines tax policy effects across generations using an overlapping 
generations general equilibrium model. I consider housing-related taxes as well as 
taxes on consumption and income by including housing assets separately from 
capital assets. In the case of Korea, households have a large portion of their assets 
as housing assets and hold substantial housing assets in old age. Thus, tax policies 
on housing assets may have significant and different effects across generations. 
Additionally, housing assets have a distinct characteristic in that housing assets, 
unlike capital assets, directly affect the utility of households by providing housing 
services rather than being used as production inputs. Accordingly, a change in 
housing property taxes can affect the choice of economic agents differently 
compared to changes in capital income taxes. 
The overlapping generations model here is an extension of that in Yang (2009) 
and Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011), and it as well separates housing and 
capital assets. These studies note that housing plays a role not only as an asset to 
accumulate for savings but also as collateral under imperfect capital markets. In 
addition, unlike other assets, housing assets directly affect the utility of households 
through the provision of housing services. These studies mainly focus on different 
consumption and accumulation patterns pertaining to housing assets compared to 
other consumer goods and assets (Gervais, 2002; Yang, 2009; Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger, 2011; Díaz and Luengo-Prado, 2010). In this paper, I 
extend this model by introducing taxes on housing assets, consumption, and labor 
and capital income types. 
I compare the effects of tax policy changes on the overall economy and on 
welfare. According to my model, the welfare losses are lower when raising housing 
property taxes and consumption taxes compared to tax increases on capital and 
labor income. An increase in housing property taxes encourages investments in 
capital assets instead of housing assets and promotes economic growth, which 
reduces the welfare loss of future generations. Similarly, increased consumption 
taxes induce capital accumulation and production instead of consumption. On the 
other hand, increasing the capital income tax reduces aggregate capital and 
production, resulting in the largest welfare loss.  
VOL. 40 NO. 2  The Intergenerational Effects of Tax Policy in an  55 
 Overlapping Generations Model with Housing Assets 
I also analyze the intergenerational impacts of tax increases along the transition 
path. An increase in labor income taxes reduces the welfare of the current working 
age group and future generations who will work and earn labor income, but it 
scarcely affects the welfare of older people in retirement. On the other hand, taxes 
on assets have negative effects on the welfare of older people, who have 
accumulated assets for retirement. In particular, increasing housing property taxes 
lowers the welfare of the elderly the most because they hold substantial housing 
assets to consume housing services and finance non-housing consumption in 
retirement. However, the welfare losses of young and future generations is less 
than in other tax reform cases because an increase in housing property taxes does 
not decrease economic efficiency. 
Many studies have examined the effects of tax policy on overall economy 
efficiency and welfare gains or losses across generations using the overlapping 
generations model. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) examine the intergenerational 
effects of tax policies on wages, consumption and capital income. Altig et al. 
(2001) study the welfare effects of tax policy changes between and within 
generations. In the case of Korea, Kim (2013) examines the tax policy effects to 
preserve tax revenues which were reduced due to the corporate tax cut of 2008. 
Overall, the literature on tax policy focuses on taxes on labor income, consumption 
and capital income, but I introduce housing related taxes, which have not been 
addressed in the literature.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical 
findings with regard to distributions of incomes, assets, and related taxes across 
ages. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 calibrates the model and shows 
quantitative results based on the model. Section 6 presents empirical results on 
heterogeneous preferences for tax policies across generations using survey data, 
and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Empirical Findings 
 
In this section, I analyze the current tax burden across ages using the 2012 (wave 
5) National Survey of Tax and Benefit. The survey data provides information about 
households’ tax burden, including individual income taxes, property taxes, and 
comprehensive real estate taxes. Using this information, I compare the distributions 
of the tax burden with those of household incomes and assets.  
The distributions of the tax burden across age are closely related to the 
distributions of income and assets, which are the tax sources. The figure on the left 
in Figure 1 shows the distributions of total household income and earned income. 
Earned income includes salary and business incomes. Total income encompasses 
earned income as well as rental income, interest and dividend income. Both total 
income and earned income rise when people are in their 20s and 30s, peak when 
they are in their 40s and 50s and sharply decrease when they reach their 60s. The 
gap between total income and earned income increases with age, meaning that 
income other than labor income accounts for a larger share as people age. The 
figure on the right shows the individual income tax burden, including working 
income taxes and comprehensive income taxes. The distribution shows that the 
56 KDI Journal of Economic Policy MAY 2018 
average income tax burden is concentrated on working age groups under 60 years 
of age. Similarly to the income distribution, income taxes increase when people are 
in their 20s and 30s, peak when they are in their 50s, and then decline. After 
retirement the income tax burden becomes very low.  
Figure 2 shows the distributions of assets and asset holding taxes. Asset holding 
taxes includes property taxes and comprehensive real estate taxes. Total assets 
increase gradually with age, peaking when people are in their late 50s. Past that 
point, total assets decrease steadily, unlike the income distribution, which decreases 
steeply after it peaks. Even after the age of 70, the average asset size is substantial 
and close to 200 million won. Net assets, equal to total assets minus total liability, 
is distributed similarly to total asset and decreases gradually when people are past 
their 50s. Housing assets account for a large portion of total assets. Similarly to 
asset distributions, elderly people have substantial housing assets, and those in their 
70s have more housing assets than those in their 30s. Accordingly, the tax burden 
on asset holdings is the largest when people are in their late 50s and remains 
considerable when they reach their 70s and 80s. These asset-related distributions 
are distinctly different from the income-related distributions discussed above. 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of consumption expenditure across age. 
Because consumption tax is not surveyed, the distribution of consumption tax is 
not compared. However, consumption tax distribution is assumed to be quite 
similar to the consumption distribution, as much of the consumption tax is value 
added tax (VAT), which can be roughly calculated by multiplying the consumption 
expenditure by the VAT ratio. Consumption expenditures increase with age, 
peaking when people reach their 50s. Then, consumption declines, but the level of 
consumption remains constant in retirement. I also quantify consumption per adult-
equivalent, which is adjusted for changes in household size across ages. The 
distribution of consumption per adult-equivalent shows the consumption pattern 
while controlling for the household size effect on consumption.2 The pattern of 
consumption per adult-equivalence is smoother than that of household 
consumption because household size changes across ages account for much of the 
change in household consumption, especially for young people, who increase 
household sizes by marriage and childbirth. 
These results show that income sources and asset compositions vary across ages; 
hence, the main source of the tax burden also differs by age. For the working age 
group, the tax burden is mainly from labor income taxes, while older people have 
substantial tax burdens on their accumulated assets.  
Individuals experience changes in their incomes and asset holdings. Accordingly 
the tax burden on income, assets, and consumption also changes over the life cycle. 
The difference in the age-related tax burden is less problematic with regard to 
intergenerational equity from the perspective of the life cycle than in the cross-
sectional analysis, as the differences in income sources and asset compositions over 
the life cycle are experienced during one's lifetime. Even if the tax burden imposed 
on some age group is excessive due to unequal tax burdens across tax sources, all 
individuals experience a life cycle. Therefore, when the entire life cycle is considered, 
 
2Consumption per adult-equivalent is calculated by dividing household consumption by equivalence scales. I 
use equivalence scales, defined as the square-root of the household size following the recent OECD method. 
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the problem of equity between generations disappears. 
However, if the tax structure is changed at some time, the tax policy effect will 
differ across generations. Because each generation is at a different point in their life 
cycles, the dynamic effect on their welfare varies from generation to generation 
depending on the direction of tax policy changes. Which tax rate is adjusted 
directly affects the tax burden on each generation depending on their incomes and 
assets at the time of the tax policy change. Moreover, tax structure changes affect 
the choice of economic agents and the overall economy, possibly leading to 
different welfare changes across generations. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTIONS OF HOUSEHOLDS’ INCOMES AND INCOME TAXES (UNIT: KRW 10,000) 
Source: National Survey of Tax and Benefit. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTIONS OF HOUSEHOLDS’ ASSETS AND ASSET HOLDING TAXES (UNIT: KRW 10,000) 
Source: National Survey of Tax and Benefit. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTIONS OF HOUSEHOLDS’ CONSUMPTION PATTERNS (UNIT: KRW 10,000) 
Source: National Survey of Tax and Benefit.  
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III. Model 
 
In this section, I build the overlapping generations model to examine tax policy 
effects across generations. The model includes various types of taxes, such as labor 
income taxes, capital income taxes, consumption taxes, and housing-related taxes 
(i.e., housing property taxes and transaction taxes). To study housing-related taxes 
separately, this paper considers two types of assets: housing and non-housing 
assets. Non-housing assets are used as input for production, while housing assets 
are used for consumption of housing services. The model is extended based on 
work by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) and Yang (2009). For modeling 
simplicity, I assume that a housing rental market does not exist.3 
 
A. Preferences 
 
Each period, a new generation enters into the model and begins working. Then, 
the generation retires at RT  and can live up to T . The conditional probability of 
individuals aged t  surviving to become age 1t   is ts . Here, Ts  is defined as 0. 
Individuals maximize their expected lifetime utility, which is derived from 
general consumption on non-housing goods ( tc ), consumption of housing service 
( 1th  ), and leisure (1 tl ), 
 
(1)   
11 11
11
0 1
1Max E | 11 1
T t tt t
t
c h lB
   

 


     
  
where   is a discount factor,   is a risk aversion parameter, and   is a labor 
supply elasticity parameter.   is a parameter measuring the weight of 
consumption of non-housing goods over consumption of housing services. 
Individuals have one unit of time in each period. Before they reach retirement 
age, each individual makes a labor supply decision at the beginning of each period. 
If they choose to work, they spend time working as much as tl  and earn labor 
income. Instead, they have a disutility from working. After they retire, they do not 
choose to work. 
The heterogeneity of the labor productivity of individuals comes from age and 
idiosyncratic shocks. Total labor productivity at age t  is t te , where t  is the 
average labor productivity at age t  and te  is an idiosyncratic shock of labor 
 
3While Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) do not include a housing rental market in their model, Yang 
(2009) accounts for the housing rental market with a renting shock that makes individuals rent. According to 
Yang’s results, as the cost of buying a house decreases, households acquire more housing assets instead of renting. 
This implies that housing-related tax policy effects are greater in a model which assumes a housing rental market 
than in a model without a rental market. 
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productivity. te  is assumed to follow a Markov process, and its transition 
probability matrix is  |e e  . 
The consumer problem can be represented as 
 
(2)       , ,, , , max , , 1, , ,c a h l tV t a h e U c h l s E V t a h e           
subject to 
 
   
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1 1 1 1 1
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c
l a h h
c a h h h
w el r a h b
a h h
 
     

      
         
      
 
 
where V  is a value function, r  is the real interest rate, w  is the wage rate for 
one efficiency unit of labor, and h  is the depreciation rate for housing assets. 
Individuals receive government transfer b  and the new generation who enters 
into the model receives accidental bequests of  . They make decisions about 
consumption and the allocation of capital and housing assets. Individuals are 
assumed to derive utility from the consumption of housing services equal to the 
value of the housing assets held. They can borrow capital but face a borrowing 
constraint. Borrowing capital is limited to   of the value of the housing asset 
held. Here, housing assets are used as collateral. If individuals borrow capital, 
0a  , I assume that capital income taxes are not paid. 
, ,c l a    and h  denote the consumption tax rate, the labor income tax rate, 
the capital income tax rate, and the housing property tax rate, respectively. When 
capital income is positive, a capital income tax is imposed.  ,h h   is the 
housing transaction tax that is paid when people buy housing assets and b  is the 
the housing transaction tax rate. The transaction tax is paid when the value of the 
housing asset increases or decreases more than the depreciated value. 
 
   0 if 1otherwise., { hb h h hhh h       
 
Using first-order conditions of the consumer’s maximization problem, I derive 
the following equations. 
 
(3)       
 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
h h h ac
h b
c a a
rUU
r r
     
            
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(4)         1 1 11 1 cch b h h hc c
sE UUU r
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 if or 1 ; andhh h h h a h           
Equation (3) shows which costs are linked to housing assets or housing services 
when the borrowing constraint is not binding ( a h    ). An increase in housing 
assets leads to a utility gain from housing services but incurs utility costs from 
direct costs related housing assets and the implicit opportunity cost of buying 
housing assets instead of capital assets. When increasing housing assets, 
individuals pay housing transaction taxes. They will also pay depreciation on 
housing assets and housing property taxes in the next period. With these explicit 
costs, they also lose the opportunity to invest in capital assets with a return of 
 1 a r . If the borrowing constraint is binding ( a h    ), the value of housing 
as a collateral is added. As housing assets are increased, they can borrow more 
capital at a rate of κ  using the housing assets as collateral. Instead, the interest cost 
on more borrowed capital is borne in the next period. 
 
B. Firm 
 
The representative firm produces goods using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, 
 
  1,F K L L K   
 
where K  is the aggregate capital stock and L  is the aggregate labor input. The 
produced goods are used for consumption by consumers, government consumption, 
and investments with which to produce capital assets and housing assets. 
Therefore, 
 
 , k hF K L Y C G I I     , 
 
where C  is the aggregate consumption of non-housing goods, G  is the aggregate 
government consumption, kI  is the investment in capital assets, and hI  is the 
investment in housing assets. 
 
C. Government 
 
Governments raise revenue by collecting taxes and run a balanced budget every 
period. The tax revenues consist of taxes on consumption, labor income, capital 
asset income, housing property, and housing transactions. The tax revenue is used 
for government consumption (G ) and transfers for households (b ).
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D. Equilibrium 
 
A competitive equilibrium consists of the value function  , , ,V t a h e , policy 
functions of consumption, capital and housing asset holdings, the labor supply, 
       , , , , , , , , , , , ,c a h e a a h e h a h e l a h e   aggregate capital and labor inputs, 
 ,K L , input prices,  ,r w , and the invariant distributions of consumers, 
 , ,a h e  such that the following hold: 
 
a. Given r  and w , policy functions solve the consumer’s problem (2). 
 
b. The firm maximizes its profit and input prices satisfy 
 ,Lw F K L  
 ,K Kr F K L    
 
c. The goods market clears 
      , , , , , ,c a h e a a h e h a h e d G       
      , 1 1k hF K L a h d        
 
d. Capital and labor input markets clear 
 , ,a a h e d K    
 , ,el a h e d L    
 
e. The government runs a balanced budget. 
    1 ,c l a h hc w el ra h h h d G b                
 
IV. Quantitative Analysis 
 
A. Calibration 
 
The time period for the model is five years. The model has 12 generations, 
denoted by 1, , 12.t    Each generation enters into the model at the age of 25 
( 1t  ), and can live up to 85 years old ( 12t  ). The retirement age ( RT ) is 
assumed to be 65 ( 9t  ). The conditional survival probability   1Tt ts   is from the 
life table of 2010. 
The stochastic part of labor productivity is assumed to follow the AR (1) 
process, i.e.,  
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   , 1 , ,ln ln ei t i t i te e    , 
 
where  2, 0,ei t eN  . To estimate this part, I use the labor income of waves 1 to 
15 of the Korea Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS). To be consistent with the 
period of the model, labor income is summed for each five years. The estimates are 
0.81 and 0.35e   . 
The age-specific labor productivity is calculated by estimating the age-labor 
income profile using KLIPS data. The average labor productivity at age t follows 
the equation 
 
  2 3ln 3.2469 0.3672 0.0065 0.000034t t t t        . 
 
The new generation which enters into the model receives accidental bequests 
from individuals who die. The bequests are distributed to the new generation 
following the distribution of net assets of 25-year-old individuals, as estimated 
from the 2012 Korea Finance and Welfare Survey. The remaining bequests are then 
given equally to the new generation aged 25.   
If individuals decide to work, they work for a fixed number of working hours l , 
assumed to be one third of their total time. The value of the risk aversion parameter 
  is set to 1.2, within the range of values used in the literature.   is set to 0.39, 
the value of the capital income share in 2012. The labor supply elasticity   is set 
to 1. Given that the number of working hours is a fixed constant, the value of this 
parameter does not affect the result. The annual depreciation rate for capital k  is 
set to 10% and the annual depreciation rate for housing assets h  is 4%. The 
selected upper limit of the loan-to-value ratio ( ) is 50%. 
The annual discount factor 0.975   is chosen so that the capital-output ratio 
in the model matches that of the data. To be consistent with the model economy, 
output is calculated as GDP minus the value of housing services from the National 
Account (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2011; Yang, 2009). The weight 
parameter between the amounts of consumption of housing services and non-
housing goods, 0.545  , is set such that the share of housing assets among total 
assets is equal to 63%, which is calculated from the 2012 Korea Finance and 
Welfare Survey. The parameter of disutility from working, B , is selected to meet 
the average employment rate from KLIPS, which is 69%. 
The consumption tax rate c  is set to 10%, which is the value-added tax rate. 
The labor income tax rate l , which includes labor income taxes and social 
security contributions, is set to 20%, as calculated from the OECD tax database. 
The housing property tax rate h  is set to 0.106% per annum, which is the actual 
effective tax rate.4 The housing transaction tax rate for buying housing assets, b , 
 
4The housing property tax rate is calculated by multiplying the effective tax rate of local housing property 
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is set to 1.3% of the house price, which includes the acquisition tax and related 
special taxes (Kim, 2015). The model does not explicitly include corporate taxes 
the firm’ profits, as firms are assumed to be in perfect competition and do not 
generate excess profits in the model. Corporate taxes are assumed to be imposed on 
the capital income of individuals that provide capital assets for production. The 
capital income tax rate a  is set to 36% so that the model can meet the ratio of 
capital income taxes, including taxes on individuals’ capital incomes and corporate 
incomes, to output from the data. Government consumption is set to 15% of output. 
 
B. Steady State 
 
Figure 4-6 compares the life-cycle patterns of labor income, consumption, 
housing assets ( h ), non-housing assets ( a ), and the employment rate from the 
model with those from the data. The data patterns of average labor income, 
consumption, and employment rate are estimated from the KLIPS data used to 
estimate the age-labor income profile in the model. The patterns of housing and 
non-housing assets are estimated from the 2012 Korea Finance and Welfare Survey, 
as used to calculate asset-related moments for the calibration.  
The distributions of housing and non-housing assets in the model are similar to 
those from the data. The distribution of housing assets is smoother than that of non-
housing assets. Young agents initially borrow capital to buy housing assets needed 
to consume housing services in the model. They then accumulate financial assets 
while working and later dissave them for consumption in retirement. On the other 
hand, agents tend to hold housing assets when retired because they still need to 
consume housing services and can finance non-housing consumption using the 
housing asset as collateral for borrowing.   
The labor income distribution for workers in the model is also close to that from 
the data. The pattern of labor income is hump-shaped and peaks when people are in 
their 40s. Working age agents earn substantial labor income, after which labor 
income decreases after it peaks up to retirement. Because agents are assumed not to 
work in retirement in the model, retirees do not have any labor income. In the data, 
however, some older agents continue to work even after retirement age and have 
positive average labor incomes. Employment rates also have hump-shaped patterns 
in the data and the model. In the model, the employment rate peaks when people 
are in their 30s, whereas it is highest when people are in their 40s in the data. 
Consumption in the model is flat across ages, similar to consumption per adult-
equivalent from the data (Yang, 2009; Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2011). 
Given that the model does not take into account household sizes, it does not reflect 
changes in household consumption due to changes in household sizes across ages. 
Due to this limitation, I do not compare the intergenerational effects of 
consumption taxes in the analysis that examines tax policy effects across 
generations taking into account transition paths.  
                                                                                                         
taxes and the comprehensive real estate tax, which is 0.265% (Lee, 2015b), by the ratio of the tax base to the 
market value, 0.399 (Park, 2014). 
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FIGURE 4. LIFE-CYCLE PATTERNS OF HOUSING AND NON-HOUSING ASSETS 
 
  
FIGURE 5. LIFE-CYCLE PATTERNS OF LABOR INCOME AND CONSUMPTION 
 
 
FIGURE 6. LIFE-CYCLE PATTERNS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RATE5 
 
Figure 7 shows the life-cycle patterns of the tax burdens. The labor income tax, 
capital income tax and consumption tax distributions are similar to the labor 
income, non-housing asset and consumption distributions, respectively. Labor 
income taxes are levied on working age agents. On the other hand, the capital 
income tax burden peaks when people are in their 50s and 60s and have 
accumulated assets in preparation for retirement. Consumption taxes are constant 
across ages, similar to the consumption pattern from the model. The distribution of 
housing property taxes is close to the pattern of housing assets, which increases 
with age and gradually decreases after retirement. Accordingly, the elderly bear a 
substantial housing property tax burden. The burden of the housing transaction tax 
 
5The employment rate of workers 65 and over is set to 0 in the data, as in the model. 
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FIGURE 7. LIFE-CYCLE PATTERNS OF TAX BURDENS 
 
is mainly seen in early and later life. The housing transaction tax burden is highest 
for young agents because they buy housing assets actively to consume housing 
services. Thereafter, the transaction tax is gradually lowered and surges again in the 
last period of life because those at this stage sell the housing assets that they have 
held. Although the pattern of housing transaction taxes across ages could not be 
directly compared to that from the data, actual transaction taxes may be levied 
primarily on young agents, who must buy larger homes for marriage and childbirth. 
In addition, the transaction tax burden may increase in old age as the elderly 
downsize their housing. 
Table 1 compares the shares of tax revenue from each tax source in the model to 
those from the data. The capital income tax rate in the model is set to meet the 
share of capital income tax revenue from the data, but for other tax rates, the shares 
of tax revenue are not targeted in the calibration. The shares of tax revenue from 
each tax source in the model are similar to those in the data. Tax revenue on labor 
income is 12.2% of output in the model, which is slightly greater than that in the data, 
 
TABLE 1—STEADY STATE 
The Ratio of Tax to Output Model Data 
Labor Income Tax 0.122 0.010 
Consumption Tax (Value Added Tax) 0.035 0.045 
Capital Income Tax 0.039 0.039 
Housing Property Tax 0.004 0.003 
Housing Transaction Tax 0.004 0.004 
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10.4%. Housing property tax revenue and housing transaction tax revenue in the 
data (0.3% and 0.4%, respectively) are similar to those in the model (0.4% of 
output in both cases). The value-added tax revenue on consumption is 3.5% of 
output in the model, which is lower than the value of 4.5% in the data. 
 
C. Tax Reforms 
 
In this section, I examine the effects of tax reforms on the economy and the 
welfare of generations. I consider tax reforms that lead to a 10% increase in total 
tax revenue by adjusting each tax rate. 
Table 2 compares the initial steady states and the new steady states of tax 
reforms increasing the tax rates on consumption, capital income, and housing 
property and labor income. I assume that the increased tax revenue is used for 
government consumption when analyzing the effects of tax policy changes.  
With regard to increasing the consumption tax, the aggregate capital (K) and 
output (Y)6 are increased by 0.04% and 0.17% in such a case compared to the 
benchmark economy. The increased consumption tax encourages investments in 
capital instead of consumption, leading to more production. Moreover, when 
housing property taxes are increased, the positive effects of the tax reform on 
capital accumulation and production are much greater. Increasing housing property 
tax rates reduces the demand for housing assets, which may decrease investments 
in housing assets and output. Instead, the increased tax burden on housing assets 
could encourage the investments in capital assets and increase production. In my 
model, increasing the tax burden on housing assets leads to increases in capital 
accumulation and production by 3.81% and 2.18%, respectively. 
On the other hand, if capital income taxes increase, both aggregate capital and 
production output are lowered. The increase in the tax burden with regard to capital 
income hinders investments in capital, which leads to reductions in capital 
accumulation by 7.91% and production by 2.55%. Instead, agents increase their 
labor supply to compensate for the income reduction, causing the employment rate 
to increase by 1.11%. If the labor income tax is increased, capital is reduced by 
2.03% and production output by 0.99%. Furthermore, the employment rate is 
lowered slightly.  
I compare welfare losses from tax reforms using the concept of equivalent 
consumption variation (ECV) with regard to how much non-housing consumption 
(%) should be changed under the benchmark economy in order to gain welfare as 
much as in the post-reform period. The tax reform of increasing housing property 
 
6As mentioned in the calibration section, output (Y) is calculated as GDP minus the value of housing services. 
Because this model does not include housing rental markets, I do not explicitly calculate the value of housing 
services, which can be calculated based on rents actually paid. Instead, I compare tax policy effects on output not 
including the value of housing services. However, even when the value of housing services is considered, this 
paper’s main outcomes with regard to the tax policy effects on output would not be affected. If I assume that the 
rental housing market exists in the model, the rental price on housing services could be derived from the cost of 
housing services, as determined by equation (3). With rental prices and housing assets, the value of imputed rent 
could be calculated across tax reform scenarios. According to the calculation results, the changes in the total GDP 
including output and the imputed rent are -1.15, -2.80, 0.18, and 2.11% when increasing taxes on labor income, 
capital income, consumption, and housing property, respectively. These tax policy effects on GDP are quite similar 
to those on output in Table 2, and the results of this paper therefore remain valid. 
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TABLE 2—TAX REFORMS 
 Bench mark 
 A 10% Increase in Total Tax Revenue (%) 
 Labor Income Tax 
Capital Income 
Tax 
Consumption 
Tax 
Housing Property 
Tax 
Tax Revenue   10% 
Output (Y) 0.171  -0.99 -2.55 0.17 2.18 
Capital (K) 0.497  -2.03 -7.91 0.04 3.81 
Employment Rate 68.9  -0.54 1.11 0.38 1.59 
Welfare (ECV)   -5.23 -5.52 -3.78 -2.67 
 
taxes shows the smallest welfare loss, a 2.67% decrease in consumption. Increasing 
housing property taxes raises investments in capital assets instead of housing 
assets, thereby increasing production. This positive effect of housing property taxes 
on the overall efficiency of the economy reduces the welfare loss from the tax 
increase and leads to the lowest welfare loss among the tax reforms. 
Similarly, increasing consumption taxes leads to a relatively small welfare loss, a 
3.78% decrease in consumption, because the increases in capital accumulation and 
production compensate to some extent for the welfare loss due to the tax increase. 
However, the tax reform choice of increasing capital income taxes results in the 
largest welfare loss, a 5.52% decrease in consumption. Because the increased 
capital income taxes reduce capital accumulation and the overall size of the 
economy, the welfare loss becomes greater. 
Overall, in the model economy, the tax reform choices of increasing tax revenues 
lead to a welfare loss, but tax policy changes that raise housing property taxes and 
consumption taxes are better than other tax increases in terms of economic 
efficiency and welfare. The result pertaining to consumption taxes is consistent 
with those in previous studies. For housing property taxes, newly introduced here, 
increasing the tax burden on housing assets could allocate resources more 
efficiently from housing assets not used for production to capital assets, which are 
production inputs. 
Figure 8 shows the welfare changes across generations by each tax reform 
choice along the transition path from the initial steady state to the new steady state. 
The X-axis represents age at the time of the tax policy change and the negative 
numbers denote future generations who enter into the model economy after the tax 
reform. For future generations, the figure shows the change in lifetime 
consumption under the benchmark economy in order to gain welfare as much as in 
the post-reform period, and for the current generation it shows the change in 
consumption over the period remaining after this time point.  
Each tax reform has different impacts on different generations. While the 
increase in labor income tax sharply reduces the welfare of the working age group, 
the welfare of older people not participating in the labor force while in retirement is 
hardly affected. Specifically, younger and future generations experience larger 
welfare losses because they are expected to earn substantial amounts of labor 
income by working over their lifetimes. Furthermore, the increased labor income 
taxes reduce output and slow economic growth, which deepens the welfare 
reduction of future generations.  
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FIGURE 8. WELFARE CHANGE BY TAX REFORM (UNIT: %) 
Note: The X-axis represents the age at the time of the tax policy change. The negative numbers on the X-axis 
denote future generations entering the model economy after the tax policy change. 
 
In contrast, when raising housing property taxes, the reduction in welfare is 
greater for older age groups. Because the elderly hold considerable housing assets 
to consume housing services and finance non-housing consumption, the increased 
housing property tax rate hurts their welfare. On the other hand, increased housing 
property taxes induce investments in capital assets, which are used for production 
instead of housing assets, thus expanding the size of the economy. This has a 
positive effect on the welfare of future generations, and the welfare loss of future 
generations is accordingly smallest among all tax reform choices.  
An increase in capital income taxes decreases the welfare of future generations 
the most. Contrary to the case of increasing housing property taxes, increasing 
capital income taxes reduces capital accumulation and production, which lowers 
the welfare of future generations. For the current generation, an increase in the 
capital income tax reduces the welfare of those in their 50s and 60s the most 
because they have accumulated substantial capital assets to finance consumption 
when in retirement. On the other hand, the effects of increasing the capital income 
tax on young people, who hold few capital assets, and the elderly, who dissave 
capital assets for consumption, are relatively minor. 
 
V. Heterogeneous Preference on Tax Policy across Generations 
 
The above results using the overlapping generations model show that the tax 
policy effects can differ across generations. In this section, I examine actual 
preferences with reference to tax policy across age groups using survey results 
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from the KDI Generation Study of 2015. Tax policy changes are based on a 
consensus among members of society at present; hence, it is important to consider 
the opinions of the current generation concerning policy implementation. The 
opinions of the current generation on tax policy can be compared to the model 
results for the current generation. 
The survey conducted in order to study intergenerational issues covers 3,500 
individuals aged 15 to 79, and each age group, from teenagers to those in their 
seventies, contains 500 individuals. The survey includes the question “Which tax 
do you prefer if you need to pay more taxes?” Using the answers to this question, I 
examine preferred tax policies across age groups.  
Figure 9 shows the most preferred tax among consumption taxes, corporate and 
individual income taxes, and property taxes when respondents are forced to pay 
more in taxes. In this case, 48% of the respondents choose corporate income taxes. 
Corporate income taxes seem to be most often preferred, as they are directly 
applied to the corporate sector rather than to the household sector. Individual 
income taxes and property taxes were next. Consumption taxes are least favored. 
Table 3 presents the factors that affect opinions about preferred taxes. The 
preference for favored taxes in the case of a tax increase is examined from the first 
rank to the fourth rank. The preferred tax ranking is the dependent variable and 
ordered logistic regression is used for the estimation. Main explanatory variables 
are dummy variables for each age group from their twenties to their seventies. I 
also include the control variables of household income, household assets and debt, 
the number of household members, a progressive political view, gender, education, 
marital status, and dummies for area.  
Regarding corporate income taxes, there were no significant differences in 
preferences across ages. Every age group selects corporate income taxes as their 
favored tax if taxes have to be raised. Households with more financial assets do not 
prefer corporate income taxes, as capital income taxes are levied on capital 
incomes from financial assets. Households with higher incomes prefer to increase 
corporate income taxes to other taxes. Moreover, households with a progressive 
political view are more likely to prefer an increase in corporate income taxes. 
For individual income taxes, working age groups do not prefer an increase in this 
type of tax. Those in their 30s and 40s, whose incomes rise sharply and reach their 
peak, especially do not favor an increase in individual income taxes. With other 
control variables, households with greater incomes are less likely to prefer an 
increase in individual income taxes. 
 
 
FIGURE 9. FAVORED TAX RANKING (UNIT: %) 
Source: KDI Generation Study 2015.
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TABLE 3—PREFERRED TAX IN THE CASE OF A TAX INCREASE 
Dependent Variables Corporate Income Tax Individual Income Tax Property Tax Consumption Tax (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age Dummy (Reference Group: 70s)         
(1) 20s 0.136 (0.120) 
-0.186 
(0.186) 
-0.162 
(0.113) 
0.139 
(0.181) 
0.193* 
(0.112) 
0.268 
(0.176) 
-0.196* 
(0.117) 
-0.266 
(0.180) 
(2) 30s 0.082 (0.116) 
-0.156 
(0.170) 
-0.368***
(0.113) 
-0.166 
(0.163) 
0.487***
(0.117) 
0.573***
(0.162) 
-0.294** 
(0.116) 
-0.350** 
(0.165) 
(3) 40s 0.136 (0.118) 
-0.011 
(0.173) 
-0.262** 
(0.116) 
-0.117 
(0.164) 
0.209* 
(0.115) 
0.339** 
(0.165) 
-0.081 
(0.112) 
-0.159 
(0.161) 
(4) 50s 0.159 (0.115) 
0.041 
(0.160) 
-0.213* 
(0.118) 
-0.101 
(0.158) 
0.146 
(0.115) 
0.287* 
(0.157) 
-0.114 
(0.113) 
-0.219 
(0.153) 
(5) 60s -0.109 (0.117) 
-0.205 
(0.133) 
-0.057 
(0.115) 
-0.007 
(0.127) 
0.148 
(0.122) 
0.240* 
(0.127) 
-0.002 
(0.109) 
-0.045 
(0.119) 
Household Income (log)  0.222***(0.060)  
-0.135** 
(0.065)  
-0.112* 
(0.060)  
0.050 
(0.071) 
Household Real Estate Assets (log)  0.001 (0.032)  
0.039 
(0.033)  
-0.075** 
(0.030)  
0.041 
(0.035) 
Household Financial Assets (log)  -0.034* (0.020)  
0.015 
(0.019)  
0.021 
(0.019)  
-0.009 
(0.017) 
Household Debt (log)  -0.003 (0.009)  
-0.008 
(0.009)  
-0.012 
(0.009)  
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
Number of Household Members  -0.066 (0.044)  
0.026 
(0.045)  
0.062 
(0.044)  
-0.041 
(0.045) 
Progressive Political View  0.202** (0.093)  
-0.156* 
(0.082)  
0.116 
(0.084)  
-0.190** 
(0.092) 
Observations 3,000 2,997 3,000 2,997 3,000 2,997 3,000 2,997 
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates from ordered logistic regressions. In columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), gender, education, marital status, regions are controlled. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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On the other hand, with regard to property taxes, younger age groups prefer to 
increase this type of tax. In column (6), compared to those in their 70s, other age 
groups are more likely to prefer to raise property taxes, while younger people, 
especially those in their 30s, favor an increase in property taxes. Households with 
more real estate assets do not prefer to raise property taxes because they are 
expected to bear a higher tax burden.  
Consumption taxes are less preferred by the younger age groups. In particular, 
the preference for increased consumption taxes is lowest for those in their 20s and 
30s, whose consumption is expected to increase as their household sizes increase 
with marriage and childbirth.  
Although the model could not reflect all of the factors that influence actual tax 
policy preferences, the empirical results in several respects are quite consistent 
with the model results for the current generation along the transition path. The 
preferences for increased labor income taxes and property taxes are distinctly 
different across generations depending on their incomes and assets. Increased 
property taxes are not preferred by the elderly according to the empirical analysis. 
This outcome is similar to the result from the model, which showed that increased 
housing property taxes lead to a greater reduction in the welfare of older age 
groups, who have substantial housing assets. On the other hand, younger age 
groups do not favor individual income tax increases because people in this age 
group have significant earned income by working, consistent with the model result, 
which held that increases in labor income taxes reduce the welfare of working age 
groups the most. However, unlike the theoretical prediction for capital income 
taxes, preferential differences for corporate income taxes across age groups are not 
found in the empirical analysis. All age groups prefer to raise corporate income 
taxes. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines tax policy effects across generations. I develop an 
overlapping generations model that includes taxes on labor income, capital income, 
consumption, and housing assets. With the model, I compare the effects of tax 
reforms that increase tax revenues through each tax rate increase. When increasing 
the housing property tax, capital accumulation and production increase because 
investments in capital assets are accelerated as opposed to those in housing assets. 
Similarly, increased consumption taxes also lead to capital accumulation instead of 
consumption. Accordingly, economy growth is promoted in these two cases and the 
welfare loss to be borne by future generations is relatively small. Moreover, the tax 
rate adjusted to increase tax revenues has different effects on the welfare of 
generations because incomes and assets differ across generations at the time of the 
tax changes. An increase in labor income taxes reduces the welfare of the working 
age group but scarcely affects retirees. On the other hand, taxes on assets increase 
the tax burden on the elderly, who have accumulated assets for consumption. 
Specifically, raising housing property taxes leads to a greater reduction in the 
welfare of older age groups, whereas the welfare loss of future generations is the 
smallest among the tax reform options. 
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These results show that the tax burden imposed on each generation varies 
depending on the direction of tax policy changes. Currently, as welfare spending has 
expanded, there is a growing consensus with regard to the need to increase taxes. The 
change in tax policy is related to the intergenerational question of who should bear 
the burden of increasing benefits. Thus, when discussing tax increases, the 
intergenerational effects of tax policy as addressed here must be considered as a 
group. However, the model economy in this paper has limitations, and the results 
should be cautiously interpreted. This paper has assumed that individuals can 
decide whether to work, but the working hours are fixed at the full-time level. 
Recent optimal tax policy studies show that the optimal capital income tax is 
significantly positive with an endogenous labor supply when the income 
distribution effect is considered (Conesa et al., 2009). This implies that the results 
here pertaining to capital income taxes may be overestimated. This paper also 
focuses on the distinctive characteristics of housing assets, which differ from 
capital assets, but the model here without endogenous housing prices does not take 
into account changes in housing prices according to tax policies and investments in 
housing assets for capital gains. In this sense, the tax incidence by housing price 
changes and tax policy effects on the level of speculative housing demand cannot 
be explained by this model. Furthermore, this paper does not consider housing 
market friction from the rigidity of the housing supply in the short run. It would be 
interesting to incorporate these housing-specific factors more fully into the 
overlapping generations model and to investigate tax policy effects across 
generations in future studies. 
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